Given the raft of upcoming referendums on the new EU constitution, the question of what determines voting in EU referendums is of considerable importance. Are referendums on EU treaties decided by voters' attitudes to Europe (the 'issue voting' explanation) or by voters' attitudes to their national political parties and incumbent national government (the 'second-order election model' explanation)? In one scenario, these referendums will approximate to deliberative processes that will be decided by people's views of the merits of European integration and of the new constitution. In the other scenario, they will be plebiscites on the performance of national governments. The implications of each scenario for democratic decision-making on EU issues are quite different and very far-reaching. We test the two competing explanations of the determinants of voting in EU referendums using evidence from the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty.
and may occur in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. 1 In one scenario, these referendums will approximate to deliberative processes that will be decided by people's views of the merits of European integration and of the new constitution. In the other scenario, they will be plebiscites on the performance of national governments. In this paper we assess the relative strength of these two rival interpretations of voting in EU referendums: do people vote on the basis of their attitudes to the EU (what we call the 'issue voting' or 'attitudes' explanation) or on the basis of domestic political concerns (the 'second-order election model' explanation)? We also assess the impact of the salience of the referendum campaign on the relative strength of these two explanations.
We focus on the referendums on the Nice Treaty in the Republic of Ireland. This is a useful case for two reasons. First, Irish citizens were the only ones who were asked what they thought about ratification of the Treaty of Nice. Thus, Ireland is the only case we can draw on relating to the most recent EU treaty. Secondly, there were two referendums on the Nice Treaty in
Ireland that yielded two different results. In a referendum in 2001, Irish citizens rejected the treaty, dealing a dramatic blow to the EU's plans. The Nice Treaty could not be implemented unless, and until, all member states ratified it. The Irish government then held a second referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2002 and this time Irish voters endorsed the Treaty. 2 We explore the extent to which the move from rejection to endorsement was a function of change in the relative weight of the 'second order' and 'attitudes' factors. The first Nice Treaty referendum campaign was a classic case of an ineffective campaign, with low levels of citizen interest in, and knowledge of, the treaty. After the shock of defeat in the first Nice referendum, a much more vigorous campaign was mounted at the second referendum with resultant increases in the salience of the issue and in citizens' levels of information. We can thus investigate the issue we are concerned with -the relative strength of the different interpretations of voting -in two contexts that were more or less identical except for a variable of crucial interest, namely the intensity of campaigning.
Section 2 describes the two competing explanations of EU referendum voting in more detail. Section 3 specifies how the relative merits of these explanations can be assessed in the context of the referendum campaigns on the Nice Treaty in Ireland. Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis, Section 5 reports our results and Section 6 discusses the implications of our findings in the context of the impending EU referendums on the new EU constitution.
Conflicting interpretations of EU referendum voting
There are, as noted, two distinct schools of thought on why people vote the way they do in EU (For example, on the Nordic Countries see: Aardal et al., 1998 . On Denmark in particular see: Siune and Svensson, 1993; Siune et al.,1994; Svennson, 1994 and . On the Baltic statestesting the hypothesis that authoritarian values lead people to reject membership of the EU in a referendum -see Ehin, 2001 . On Norway and Britain -focusing on the relationship between economic left-right positions and support for membership -see Pierce et al., 1983) . Overall, the 'attitudes' approach assumes that views on the EU and/or on the substance of the treaty are the main determinants of voting behaviour in EU referendums.
A different approach to explaining voting behaviour in EU referendums focuses on concerns quite separate from the EU. This explanation is associated with the theory that certain elections are best seen as 'second-order' elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk et al., 1996 ; for a similar approach see Anderson, 1998 Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Franklin et al., 1995; Franklin, 2002; Svensson, 2002; Marsh, 1998, and Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004) . Voters who, for whatever reasons, are not satisfied with the performance of the incumbent government may take the opportunity to punish the government by voting against the government's wishes in a 'second-order' election such as an EU referendum. Voters who are satisfied with the performance of the party (or parties) in government may vote in line with the government's wishes (supporting the governing party (or parties) in the local election, voting 'Yes' in an EU referendum, etc.).
Thus, an EU referendum may, in fact, really be a general election by another name.
A key element of the second-order election theory relates to the notion of salience.
Domestic considerations, the argument goes, will be a particularly powerful determinant of voting in situations where the election or referendum is perceived to be very unimportant. The more important the election or referendum in question is seen to be, the lower the role that will be played by domestic political (second-order) effects and the higher the role played by citizens' attitudes towards, or views on, the EU and the substantive content of the treaty in question.
Several authors have also argued that the institutional context affects how strong secondorder factors are likely to be. In a development of Schneider and Weitsman's analysis (1996) , Hug (2002) and Hug and Sciarini (2000) distinguish between a referendum that is constitutionally necessary and one that the government chooses to hold. Level of satisfaction with the incumbent government, and domestic party political factors, are likely to play a weaker role in the former compared to the latter. This is because much more damage can be inflicted on the government in a non-required referendum; losing a referendum that you did not have to hold in the first place makes the government look particularly silly. They also distinguish between a binding and a nonbinding referendum. In relation to the former the result cannot be overturned whereas the parliament may possibly change the decision of a non-binding referendum. Second-order effects are likely to be stronger in non-binding than in binding referendums. This is because in a nonbinding referendum, voters who wish to punish the incumbent government by voting against the referendum can hope that, if the referendum is rejected, the outcome may then be overturned by the parliament.
On balance, we would characterise both the Irish Nice referendums as necessary and binding (for a discussion of the institutional context and, in particular, of the initiation of referendums in Ireland see Sinnott, 2002: 811-14) . It may seem odd to view the first referendum as 'binding' as it clearly was not so, in the sense that the government did not accept the decision as final and went on to hold a second referendum. However, it was binding in the sense that the only way to overturn the decision was by having another referendum. The first Nice referendum was also constitutionally 'necessary' in the sense that the government almost certainly would have been brought to the High Court and forced to have a referendum if it had tried to argue that the Treaty did not have fundamental constitutional implications and thus that a referendum was not necessary. A successful judicial challenge of this sort had forced the government of the day to hold a referendum on the Single European Act and this set a precedent that would apply to any subsequent proposals for significant changes to EU treaties. The second Nice referendum was politically necessary for two further reasons. The first was that Irish political leaders have repeatedly committed themselves to holding referendums on any changes that even approach the magnitude of those contained in the Nice Treaty. Secondly, the government was under severe pressure to hold a second referendum because the result of the first referendum plunged both the accession process and Ireland's relationship with the EU into crisis. If Hug and Sciarina (2000) are right then we would expect second-order effects to be less evident in both the -necessary and One indication of the increased salience of the campaign at the second referendum compared to the first is the fact that citizens found the media a more useful source of information in relation to the referendum at Nice 2 than at Nice 1. 4 At Nice 2, 64 percent of respondents found newspaper articles either very or somewhat useful (compared to 44 percent at Nice 1), 73 percent found television news and current affairs programmes very or somewhat useful (compared to 51 percent at Nice 1), and 68 percent found radio news and current affairs programmes very or somewhat useful (compared to 46 percent at Nice 1). There was also a marked increase in the proportion of citizens who found discussion with family, friends and colleagues very or somewhat useful (64 percent at Nice 2 compared to 48 percent at Nice 1). One consequence of the higher salience campaign at Nice 2 was the increase in citizens' level of knowledge of the treaty and issues relating to the treaty. At Nice 1, 36 percent of respondents reported that they had either a good understanding of, or understood some of, the issues relating to the Nice Treaty. This figure had risen to 61 percent by the end of the Nice 2 campaign. 5 Thus, there had been a significant increase in citizens' comprehension of the treaty and issues relating to the treaty between Nice 1 and Nice 2, suggesting that the energetic and vigorous campaign that occurred at Nice 2 was indeed effective.
In the inter-referendum period, the pro-Nice camp sought to increase the importance of the substantive (European) issues relative to the troublesome issues of 'party politics' (aka second-order effects) and military neutrality. Specifically in relation to the issue of neutrality, which was widely felt to have contributed to the rejection of the treaty at Nice 1, the government subscribing to the 'second-order election' interpretation; to the extent that their countermeasures were successful, they will have served, in line with hypothesis two above, to weaken any potential second-order effects in the case of Nice 2.
Data
The data that we use to test our hypotheses come from two post-referendum nationally representative surveys commissioned by the EU and conduced by EOS Gallup (for an extensive analysis of these two surveys, see Sinnott, 2001 and Respondents choosing the response option 'in favour' are labelled 'pro-enlargement', respondents choosing the option 'against' are labelled 'anti-enlargement', and respondents indicating that they did not know are labelled 'neither pro-nor anti-enlargement. To tap attitudes to military neutrality, respondents were asked which of the following two statements they agreed with:
Ireland should do everything it can to strengthen its neutrality even if this means being less involved in EU co-operation on foreign and defence policy OR Ireland should be willing to accept limitations on its neutrality so that it can be more fully involved in EU co-operation on foreign and defence policy
Respondents were asked to place themselves on a nine point scale (1 = agree fully with first statement and 9 = agree fully with the second statement). To retain the same metric as the measures of integration and enlargement we trichotomise responses (1-4 = 'pro-neutrality'; 6-9 = 'anti-neutrality'; 5, 'no opinion' and 'don't know' = 'neither pro-nor anti-neutrality').
In order to operationalise 'second-order' effects, the party preferences of respondents were tapped in both surveys and respondents were assigned one or other of the following labels:
supporter of a government party (Fianna Fáil or Progressive Democrats), supporter of a pro-Nice Treaty Opposition party (Fine Gael or Labour), supporter of one of the small anti-Nice
Opposition parties (Sinn Féin or the Green party), or either a supporter of no party or a very minor party (other). Ideally, a question concerning how satisfied each respondent was with the government would also have been asked in both surveys. However, a 'satisfaction' question was only asked at Nice 2 and so we only used 'satisfaction' in our analysis of that particular referendum. (Age, social class and sex were also measured and are used in the analysis as demographic control variables.) 8 The Appendix reports the frequencies for our main independent variables. Table 2 -using only demographics to predict voting behaviour (log likliehood = -339.9). Adding second-order effects to this model -operationalised in terms of party supportimproves the fit of the model by 6.0 percent (log likliehood declines to -319.7). However, the addition of 'issue effects' to this 'demographics + second order' model improves the model fit more substantially. The log likliehood declines from -319.7 to -267.6, representing an improvement of fit of 16.3 percent. 9 When the same series of analyses are conducted for Nice 2 we also find that adding issues to a 'demographics + second-order' model increases the model fit.
Results
However, this time the increase in model fit is much larger, 26.2 percent.
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
The key importance of issue effects also holds when we use a more comprehensive operationalisation of second-order effects (see Table 3 ). For Nice 2, we run a model in which second-order effects are operationalised in terms of party support and level of satisfaction with the government. As reported in We now focus our attention on the individual issues -EU integration, EU enlargement and military neutrality -and assess the relative impact of these issues at each referendum. To do this we display again -in Table 4 -the information presented in Table 1 but this time we report 'conditional maximum effects' instead of the raw coefficients (which don't lend themselves to easy substantive interpretation). In terms of the impact of issues at Nice 1, the size of the effects of the three different subjects were quite similar to each other. Pro-integrationists were 33
percentage points more likely than anti-integrationists to vote 'Yes', pro-enlargement voters were 25 percentage points more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote 'Yes', and voters who favoured limiting neutrality were 29 percentage points more likely than voters favouring a strengthening of neutrality to vote 'Yes'. However, the relative size of these attitude effects changed quite dramatically between Nice 1 and Nice 2. The impact of attitudes to integration declined slightly and the impact of attitudes to neutrality also declined somewhat, yet the impact of these reductions was more than offset by the rise in importance of attitudes to enlargement. In 2002, pro-enlargement voters were 51 percentage points more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote Yes (twice the size of the 2001 effect). 'Centrists' on enlargement were also much more likely than anti-enlargement voters to vote 'Yes' (+43 at Nice 2 compared to +7 at Nice 1).
Overall, anti-enlargement voters were 50 percentage points less likely than other voters to vote Yes (while they had only been 19 percentage points less likely at Nice 1). In the right hand column of Table 2 , we see that a different operationalisation of second-order effects -using level of satisfaction with the incumbent government in addition to party support -alters the size of each of the attitude effects only very marginally.
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>
Thus, there was a change in the relative strength of second-order and attitude factors between Nice 1 and Nice 2, driven mainly by an increase in the significance of the issue of EU enlargement. Does this increase in the impact of attitude factors explain why the result of the referendum was different at Nice 2 or do we need to take into account also changes in the distribution of opinions on the individual second-order and attitude factors? We address this question by running two counterfactual simulations. First, we can look at Nice 1 under the conditions that -the distributions of the variables relating to -party support and attitudes were as they became at Nice 2 but keeping the Nice 1 model estimates of the impact of those conditions.
The predicted vote using that model would not have been much different to the actual outcome at Nice 1: 48 percent 'Yes' instead of 46 percent. Second, we can look at Nice 2 under the conditions that party support and attitudes were as they were at Nice 1 but keeping the Nice 2 model estimates of the impact of those conditions. The predicted vote is, again, only slightly different -61 percent 'Yes' instead of 63 percent. 10 We can conclude from this that the different referendum result the second time around was not a function of changing marginals -i.e. a change in the distributions on party support and the issue variables. Rather, the result of the referendum changed because of the greater impact of the attitudinal variables. Even so, what was vital here was the changing impact of the different attitude factors, most notably the increase in the strength of the relationship between attitudes to EU enlargement and voting behaviour (and also the somewhat diminished impact of the issue of neutrality).
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Discussion and conclusion
Referendums on the issue of the new EU constitution are pending in a substantial number of EU member states. Is voting behaviour in these referendums likely to reflect citizens' thoughts on the future of the EU and on the new constitution or is it likely to simply reflect citizens' concerns about domestic party politics and their views on incumbent national governments? Our analysis of voting in the Irish Nice referendums suggests that, while the effect of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (i.e. the second-order effect) is detectable, it played a much smaller role in determining the outcome compared to the effect of attitudes to a range of European issues. In short, both Irish referendums on the Nice treaty were closer to being processes of deliberation on EU issues than to being plebiscites on the incumbent government.
The Irish experience with referendums on the Nice treaty also suggests that the more vigorous the campaign, the greater the effect of the key substantive issue relating to the referendum -in this case attitudes to EU enlargement -and the less the effect of second-order considerations. This is quite an unusual conclusion in that, in relation to general elections, campaigns are typically viewed as much less important than 'long term' determinants of voting such as social structure, party identification and ideology. It may be, however, that there is much more scope for a vigorous campaign to have an impact in referendums. All the main Irish parties -the pro-EU governing Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrats and the pro-EU Opposition Labour and Fine Gael parties -were shaken and stirred by the 'No' at Nice 1. Only the small anti-EU Sinn Féin and Green parties were pleased with the result. Rejection of the Nice Treaty in the first referendum was a serious and unexpected blow to the Irish political establishment.
Instead of the brief and limp campaign at Nice 1, the main parties, and particularly their civil society allies, delivered a vigorous, spirited and lengthy campaign at Nice 2. Strategically, they sought to 'decouple' two dangerous issues from the issue overtly at stake in the referendum. First, they sought -through the 'Declarations' and the constitutional provision mentioned above -to convince 'anti-military alliance' voters that the Nice Treaty was not in fact anything to be afraid of. The pro-camp also sought to defuse and neutralize the issue of domestic party politics. Thus they campaigned vigorously to persuade citizens that the Treaty was about the future of Europeand enlargement in particular -and not a referendum on the popularity of the Irish government.
The pro-European Opposition parties (Labour and Fine Gael) were particularly important in attempting to limit the impact of second-order effects on voting behaviour in the referendum. The fact that satisfaction with the government was significantly lower at Nice 2 than at Nice 1 does not seem to have negatively impacted on the result. Crucially, the effective campaigning of the 'Yes' side made the issue of EU enlargement the key issue in the Nice 2 campaign.
The implications for member state governments facing referendums on the EU constitution can be briefly stated. Government satisfaction levels and support for the domestic political parties are likely to play some role in determining the outcome but this role is presumably much smaller than the role played by 'issue effects', that is by attitudes to European integration and to issues arising from the new constitution. However, the extent of the impact of such European attitudes on the outcome depends on the vigour and the effectiveness of the referendum campaign. See Sinnott, 2003:8-9 ). The party preference question was also slightly different in the two surveys. In the Nice 1 survey respondents were asked which party they would vote for if there was a general election tomorrow and in Nice 2 respondents were asked to indicate the party that they 'usually support'. The breakdown of responses to both questions is similar at both time points (see Table 1 ). Note that the wording of the 'satisfaction' question was: 'Overall are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the government is running the country?' The response options were: Very satisfied; quite satisfied; quite dissatisfied; very dissatisfied. Finally, In both surveys, the age of the respondent was assigned to one or the other of five categories and social class was measured using the usual market research AB, C1, C2, DE and F categories. The gender of the respondent was also categorised. 9 There is much discussion in the literature about the possible direction of the causal relationship between our two sets of independent variables, support for the incumbent government/ governing parties and attitudes to the EU. Anderson (1998) , Gabel (1998c) and Ray (2003) argue that attitudes to the EU to some extent mediate the effect of attitudes to the incumbent government; in other words, that whether or not you support the incumbent government determines whether you have positive attitudes to the EU which in turn determines whether you support an EU Treaty in a referendum. Thus, in the analysis reported in Tables 2 and 3 , we include our variables in that order -'second-order' effects first followed by 'issue' effects. (However, when we ran a model regressing EU support on party and demographic variables, we found no significant association between party support and EU support. Also, when we ran a model regressing support for enlargement on party and demographic variables, we found no significant association between party support and enlargement support. Thus, there appear to be no significant endogeneity effects and it does not seem that attitude effects are mediating party support effects. This is in line with the general finding in Irish data that voters tend not to distinguish between the main parties on EU issues.)
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